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LEGISLATION
DEFINITION AND INTERPRETATION OF
UNCONSCIONABLE CONTRACTS
(Uniform Commercial Code)
The Uniform Commercial Code provides:
"If the court finds the contract or any claust of the contract to be
unconscionable, it may refuse to enforce the contract or may strike any
unconscionable clauses and enforce the contract as if the stricken clause
had never existed." 1
"Again there is a provision in the Sales Article which permits a court to de-
dare void an unconscionable contract.. But there is no satisfactory definition of
what is unconscionableness. A comment in earlier drafts indicated that uncon-
scionable and unreasonable were synonomous. . . .This one section of the code
will create a tremendous amount of difficulty."$
This article and similar articless in various law journals and reviews voice the
doubts and fears which have arisen among many in the legal profession about the
unconscionable contract provision of the Commercial Code. There are many prob-
lems latent in this section, but the primary problem seems to be the indefinable
quality of the word "unconscionable." How will the courts apply it? What wili
be its scope? Will it be limited? Will it be definite and apply equally in all cases?
How much discretion will the courts have in defining it? What will be the test?
These are the questions that attorneys must ponder and the ones that the courts
ef Pennsylvania (the first state to adopt the Code) must begin to answer after
July 1, 1954.
The unconscionable contract doctrine has been accepted by the equity courts
since their inception. 4 The American courts of law have been applying the doc-
trine in a disguised manner on a case-to-case basis for many years.6 Very few of
the cases, in equity or in law, have attempted to define the word unconscionable.
Thus, three sources are presented through which a definition may possibly be ob-
tained-the equity decisions, the disguised opinions of the law courts, and the
comments of the commissioners.
Perhaps the most authoritative definition came from the words of Chief Jus-
tice Fuller:6 "It may be apparent from the intrinsic nature of the bargain itself;
such as no man in his senses and not under delusion would make on the one hand,
and as no honest and fair man would accept on the other; which are unequitable
1 Act of 1953, April 6, P.L.-No. 1, 12A-P.S. 2-302.
2 J. Francis Ireton, "The Commercial Code," 22 Miss. L.J. 273 (1950-51).
8 "Policing Contracts Under the Commercial Code", 18 Univ. Chi. L.Rev. 146 (1950). "It is
doubtful whether any basis of predictability can be expected from such treatment; parties with
particularly appealing arguments may be helped in forcing settlement because of the increased un-
certainty of a court decision."
4 For a more recent case see Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80 (3d Cir. 1949); Friend
v. Lamb, 152 Pa. 529, 25 A. 577 (1893).
5 See: Uniform Commercial Code 2-302 (Official Draft) Text and Comments Edition 1952,
Comment 1.
6 US. Y. Hume, 132 U.S. 406 (1889).
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and unconscientious bargains." This definition has been quoted and used in sub-
stance in many cases.7 In addition to this it has been said that it is "an inequality
so strong, gross, and manifest that it is impossible to state it to a man of common
sense without producing an exclamation of the inequality of it. Where the in-
adequacy of the price is so great that the mind revolts at it, the court will lay hold
on the slightest circumstances of oppression or advantage to rescind it."8
These decisions give some inkling as to what the court means by unconscion-
able, but still there are no bounds to the definition. Evidently what the courts mean
to say is that any agreement in which the price is grossly unequal to the value re-
ceived is unconscionable. But where is the line to be drawn? Is that to be the only
test?
The National Commissioners on Uniform State Laws have said that "the basic
test is whether in the light of the general commercial background and the com-
mercial needs of the particular trade or case, the clause involved is so one sided
as to be unconscionable under the circumstances existing at the time of the mak-
ing of the contract. The principle is one of prevention of oppression and unfair
surprise and not of disturbance of allocation of risks because of superior bargain-
ing power." 9 This comment narrows the interpretation slightly, but the authors,
unavoidably perhaps, have tested the word in terms of itself. However, the fact
that the commissioners were concerned in preventing oppression and unfair sur-
prise and in not upsetting the allocation of risks in bargaining gives us an incisive
insight into what they had in mind.
It would seem that by "oppression and unfair surprise" it is meant that any
party who has had a chance to inquire into the merits and consequences of the
bargain and who has the competency to understand it could not be a victim of op-
pression and unfair surprise. This theory is stated in a negative way in a recent
Pennsylvania case. 10 There the decision was based upon a confidential relation-
ship, but the court said that the decision would stand even without the relation-
ship. The important part of the decision for our purposes is that part which em-
phasizes "the lack of opportunity to plaintiff to consult legal or business counsel."
The fact, however, that the commissioners were anxious not to disturb "the
allocation of risks because of superior bargaining power" would indicate that an
unequal bargain might be struck if no oppression or unfair surprise is involved.
Of course, a bargain which is fair when made may turn out to be grossly unequal
when the time for final execution arrives. The comment may be referring to this
7 Canter v. Boone County Trust Co., 92 S.W. 2d 647,657,338 Mo. 629 (1935) ; Stiefler v. Mc-
Cullough, 174 N.E. 823,826 (Ind. 1931); Hall v. Wingate, 159 Ga. 630, 126 S.E. 796,813(1924) ;
Wenninger v. Mitchell, 139 Mo. App. 420, 122 S.W. 1130,1132 (1909); Ball v. Reyburn, 136
Mo. App. 546, 118 S.W. 524 (1909).
s Stiefler v. McCullough, supra; 1 Elliott, Contracts, § 159. See: Kelley and McHale v. Caplice,
23 Kan. 474, 33Am. Rep. 179 (1880).
9 Uniform Commercial Code 2-302 (Official Draft) Text and Comments Edition 1952, Comment 1.
10 Sell v. Gup, 328 Pa. 134, 12 A.2d 1 (1940). The plaintiff in this case was a senile lady of
77, the defendant a law school graduate.
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situation, but the entire comment refers basically to the circumstances existing at
the time of the making of the contract; the most scrupulous reading cannot give
a conclusive meaning to that phrase. It is just as possible that what is meant is
that if, after having studied the bargain and having obtained legal or business
advice or having taken the risk of doing without it, the party enters a bargain
which would normally seem uneven, the court will not disturb the contract because
of the advantageous terms gained through mere persuasiveness. After all, there
are many reasons why a competent person may enter a seemingly unfair contract,
many of these reasons being highly secretive and personal in nature. Should such
a person be able to avoid that contract merely because the hidden reasons for en-
tering that contract did not pan out?
The most lucid explanation of the above theory is found in a Pennsylvania
case" involving a suit concerning the conveyance of land in which the consideration
was grossly inadequate. There the court said:
"Such gross inadequacy as there was in this case is very well calcu-
lated to fix upon the transaction a serious suspicion of its fairness. It is
contrary to all our usual experience that a man should part with his prop-
erty at five percent of its value, unless he was excessively weak or ig-
norant, or under the influence of some deception. But if the vendor was
thoroughly acquainted with every fact which it was necessary for him to
know; . . . if there were no circumstances which gave the vendee an im-
proper control over him, amounting to mental imprisonment; if, in short,
the vendee behaved honestly, and the vendor was able to act like a free
man with his eyes wide open, then the one had a right to sell, and the
other to buy, on any terms they saw proper to agree upon."
Combining the decisions of these cases with the manifested intention of the
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws it is possible to evolve a series of questions
to ask in every case of unconscionable contract which will limit the application of
this doctrine to certain specific cases and which will particularly guarantee an
equal application in all cases. The first question is this: (1) Is the agreement un-
fair on its face? This involves two sub-questions: (a) Is such a bargain within
the realms of experience? If such bargains have been made before with any fre-
quency, then it is not unusual for a man to make such an agreement. (b) Are there
any peculiar customs in the trade or peculiarities in this particular bargain which
would warrant the unequal agreement? Thus, so far, we have this much-if the
agreement is grossly unequal to the extent that it is beyond the usual experience
of people making such agreements and if there is nothing in the commercial back-
ground of such agreements or in the commercial needs of the particular case, then
the court may suspect that there is an unconscionable contract, and thus proceed to
the second question.
The second major question is: (2) Did the transaction involve any oppression
and unfair surprise? Again, to determine the answer to this major question we must
11 Davidson v. Little, 22 Pa. 245 (1853).
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ask two sub-questions: (a) Was the complaining party competent enough to un-
derstand the implications of the bargain? If this person was of sound mind, suf-
ficient intelligence, and free will then it seems that he could not have been a vic-
tim of oppression. (b) Did the party have a chance to consult legal or business
advice? The answer to this question involves inquiring into the party's need of
such advice and also an inquiry into the question of whether he passed up his op-
portunity for such advice.
Thus, the test seems to be this-if on the basis of our first question the bar-
gain seems to be unconscionable, we must then ask if the party was competent
enough to understand the bargain and if he had the opportunity of legal or busi-
ness advice. The questions, it seems to the author, are in logical order, and the
wrong answer to any of them would be enough for the court to strike the uncon-
scionable clause or bargain.
Of course, this test is not definitive or foolproof, but it forms a skeleton to
which the flesh and blood of court interpretation can be added.
Norman D. Jaffe
Member of the Middler Class
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